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Abstract
This paper documents the size and timing of the world inter-continental trade boom following
the great voyages in the 1490s of Columbus, da Gama and their followers. Indeed, a trade boom
followed over the subsequent three centuries. But what was its cause? The conventional wisdom in
the world history literature offers globalization as the answer: it alleges that declining trade barriers,
falling transport costs and overseas “discovery” explains the boom. In contrast, this paper reports the
evidence that confirms unambiguously that there was no commodity price convergence between
continents, something that would have emerged had globalization been a force that mattered. Thus, the
trade boom must have been caused by some combination of European import demand and foreign
export supply from Asia and the Americas. Furthermore, the behavior of the relative price of foreign
importables in European cities should tell us which mattered most and when. We offer detailed
evidence on the relative prices of such importables in European markets over the five centuries1350-
1850. We then offer a model which is used to decompose the sources of the trade boom 1500-1800.
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I. Introduction
Why has world trade grown? This fundamental question has been posed recently by such
notable international economists as Paul Krugman (1995) and Robert Feenstra (1998). In Krugman’s
words: “Most journalistic discussion of the growth of world trade seems to view growing integration as
driven by a technological imperative – to believe that improvements in transportation and
communication technology constitute an irresistible force dissolving national boundaries” (Krugman
1995, p. 328). An alternative explanation might stress instead declining political barriers to trade, which
(like technological improvements) help link distant markets together and erase commodity price gaps
between them. A third potential explanation seems to have been even more powerful in practice, since
it appears that fully two-thirds of the late 20th century trade boom can be explained by unusually fast
income growth (Baier and Bergstrand 2001).
This modern debate has a powerful historical resonance. Consider another canonical example
of world trade growth. The conventional wisdom is that there was a secular world trade boom
following the Voyages of Discovery by Christopher Columbus, Vasco da Gama and their European
followers. This paper measures, we believe for the first time, the size and timing of that secular trade
boom. Furthermore, and just as in the late 20th century case discussed by Krugman, there is a
conventional historical wisdom which argues that the trade boom after Columbus can be explained by
declining trade barriers and/or transport costs between Europe and the overseas continents with
whom it traded for “exotic” products, consumed by the elite. This paper rejects this view, and offers
instead the model and the evidence necessary to decompose the sources of the trade boom into the
demand and supply fundamentals that really mattered.
  The next section measures the world trade boom as it was manifested by European imports
from, and exports to, both Asia and the Americas. The evidence there shows that the share of trade in
GDP has certainly increased over the 500 years since 1492. However, it also documents that some1 In one of his first forays into history, Ronald Findlay (1982) used just such relative price
evidence in an attempt to decompose the sources of trade growth during the Industrial Revolution.
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centuries underwent far bigger world trade booms than others. Section III asks whether the trade
boom can be explained by declining trade barriers. If there was such a decline, then it should have left
a trail marked by falling commodity price gaps between exporting and importing trading partners.
There is no such evidence, suggesting that “discovery” and transport productivity improvements were
offset by trading monopoly markups, tariffs, non-tariff restrictions, wars, and pirates, all of which
served in combination to choke off trade. The trade boom would have been a lot bigger, it seems,
without those man-made interventions. 
If it wasn’t declining trade barriers that explains the trade boom after Columbus, what was it?
Section IV offers the leading demand and supply contenders. It also offers some important new
evidence: it measures the relative price of “exotic” imports from Asia and the Americas in European
urban markets over the five centuries between 1350 and 1850. These relative prices are the smoking
guns which suggest when European demand and overseas supply dominated and whether supply from
Asia and the Americas behaved differently.1 The section also offers estimates of European “surplus”
income growth, presumably the central force driving import demand. Section V develops the explicit
partial-equilibrium model and the actual decomposition of the trade boom sources, century-by-century,
from Columbus to the Crystal Palace. Finally, Section VI speculates further on the sources of the
trade boom, including the role played by China’s (and Korea’s and Japan’s) retreat from world
markets from the mid-15th century to the mid-19th century. We finish with some qualifications, and
suggestions for future research.
   2 Table 1 computes an unweighted average of the growth rates underlying all series in each
half century after 1500, and then cumulates these half-century growth rates to yield 1.06 percent per
annum between 1500 and 1800. Alternatively, one can include in the calculation only those series
describing European imports from Asia and the Americas, since in the presence of bullion flows
European export growth need not have equalled European import growth, and since we will later be
appealing to European import demand in our attempt to account for these trade flows. However, the
two calculations yield much the same result: 1.06 versus 0.97 percent per annum.  See also footnote 3. 
3 We also calculated trade growth rates excluding all nominal series on the premise that it’s
the volume of trade to be explained, not the value. If prices were falling, the 1.1 percent growth rate
would understate trade volume growth, while the reverse would be true if prices were rising.
Excluding all the nominal series in Table 1 lowers trade growth from 0.66 to 0.11 percent per annum
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II. The Trade Boom After Columbus
Table 1 documents the world trade boom between 1500 and 1992. The evidence summarized
there takes many forms, and it is never quite what we’d like: sometimes reporting trade in value,
sometimes in quantity; sometimes for one product, sometimes for another; sometimes carried by one
country, sometimes another; and never, at least until 1800 and Angus Maddison (1995), a constant
price world trade index. Still, the regional, product, and country coverage is enormous. And, in any
case, it’s all that the archives have yielded thus far.2
[Table 1 about here]
The panel at the bottom of Table 1 reports two notable facts. First, the growth of world trade
was pretty much the same in the 19th and 20th centuries, roughly 3.5 percent per annum. This is a
surprising fact, given that world GDP growth doubled from 1.5 to 3 percent per annum between 1820-
1913 and 1913-1992 (Maddison 1995: p. 227). Since the growth of world trade was almost identical in
the two centuries, it follows that trade shares rose much faster in the 19th than the 20th century. So
far, it looks like the 19th century is the canonical globalization epoch, not the 20th century. Second,
trade growth prior to 1800 was much slower, about 1.1 percent per annum. Of course, everything else
grew more slowly in this pre-industrial period too, so a 1.1 percent per annum growth rate may still be
fast enough to ensure that trade shares were on the increase in the wake of da Gama and Columbus.3in the 17th century, a big decline. In the 18th century, excluding the nominal series lowers growth from
1.26 to 0.9 percent per annum. Overall, excluding the nominal series lowers growth over the three
centuries from 1.06 to 0.76 percent per annum. These differences are big enough to suggest that we
use both – thus establishing upper and lower bounds – when, in Section V, we decompose the sources
of the trade boom.
4 The share falls in 1780 before recovering to that all-time high in 1801 (Crafts 1985, Table
6.6, p. 131).
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They were certainly on the increase in 18th century Britain where the export to GNP ratio rose from
8.4 percent in 1700, to 14.6 percent in 1760, and to 15.7 percent in 1801.4
The world history literature is written as if that 1.1 percent per annum growth rate in world
trade can be explained by globalization forces, unleashed by the voyages of Christopher Columbus and
Vasco da Gama. Can it? This is the central question that motivates this essay.
III. Was the Trade Boom Driven by Declining Trade Barriers, and Was There 
Commodity Price Convergence?
The most obvious explanation for the global trade boom is that it was caused by declining
transport costs and/or some fall in man-made barriers to trade. Such a view seems to us implicit in a
recent statement by Andre Gunder Frank that “there was a single global world economy with a
worldwide division of labour and multilateral trade from 1500 onward” (Frank 1998, p. 52). This
position is shared by several prominent world historians. Jerry Bentley views the period after 1500 as
“a genuinely global epoch of world history” (Bentley 1996, pp. 768-9). Immanuel Wallerstein believes
that by the sixteenth century a European “world-economy based upon the capitalist mode of
production” had appeared (Wallerstein 1974, p. 67). These historians are on the side of Adam Smith
who believed that “the discovery of America and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of
Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind”
(Smith 1776: 6th ed., 1791, Vol. II, Chp. VII, Pt. III, p. 139). 5 One revealing indicator is to look for entries under “prices” in the subject index of well-
known world history texts. Here are some partial results: Abu-Lughod (1989), none; Prakesh (1998),
none; McNeill (1999), one to “price revolution”; Curtin (1984), two, one on “administered prices” and
another to “price fixing”; and Chaudhuri (1982), none. The examples could be multiplied.
6 In fairness to the world historians, however, their reliance on quantity data has distinguished
allies. For example, Robert Feenstra (1998), the economist, leans heavily on such data in his discussion
of the growing integration of 20th century international commodity markets.
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If this world history pro-globalization hypothesis is correct, then we should be able to
document commodity price convergence between Europe, Asia and the Americas over the three
centuries. If we cannot document commodity price convergence, then the pro-globalization hypothesis
must be rejected and we will have to search for other explanations of the trade boom.
Definitions matter, of course. Although it is commodity price convergence that matters for the
integration of international commodity markets, and which to us signals globalization as it affects
international trade, historians rarely look for evidence of such convergence or its absence.5 They tend
instead to look at quantity data, such as trade volumes, or qualitative information, such as the rise and
fall of trade routes.6 For globalization as we define it to have an independent influence on an economy, 
trade-creating forces must change domestic commodity prices: it is these changes in domestic
commodity prices which trigger changes in such variables as the distribution of income (e.g., land
rents relative to wages), absolute living standards or the quality of life.
Where, then, should we look for evidence of globalization as we define it? Initially, only goods
with very high value to bulk ratios were shipped, like silk, exotic spices and precious metals. Indeed,
long distance trade in the pre-18th century period was strictly limited to what might be called non-
competing goods: Europe imported spices, silk, sugar and gold, which were not found there at all, or
were in very scarce supply; Asia imported silver, linens and woolens, which were not found there at
all (with the important exception of Japanese silver before 1668). Dutch exports of precious metals to
Asia accounted for between a half and two-thirds of the value of Asian products imported into Europe
by the Dutch East India Company (hereafter, VOC: Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, established7 Findlay (1996, pp. 53-4).
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1602),7 while VOC imports into Europe were dominated by spices, tea, coffee, drugs, perfumes, dye-
stuffs, sugar and saltpetre. Indeed these were 84 percent of the VOC import total in 1619/1621, 73
percent in 1698/1700, and still a hefty 64 percent as late as 1778-1780 (Prakesh 1998, Table 4.1, p.
115). Imports into Lisbon from Asia were almost all spices in 1518 (Prakesh 1998, Table 2.2, p. 35).
Textiles came to take a larger share of that total, but spices were still 88 percent of Asian imports into
Lisbon by 1610 (Prakesh 1998, Table 2.3, p. 36). Even the English East India Company, famous for
their gamble to focus on the Indian textile trade, had imports heavily weighted by spices and other
luxuries: the figure is 43.4 percent in 1668-1670 and 46.5 percent in 1758-1760 (Prakesh 1998, Table
4.2, p. 120).  By definition, these non-competing goods were very expensive luxuries in importing
markets, and thus could bear the very high cost of transportation from their (cheap) sources. Also by
definition, their presence or absence in Europe had no impact on domestic production since they were
non-competing.
So what is the evidence of price convergence for those commodities which were traded
during the Age of Commerce? Elsewhere we have reviewed the evidence (O’Rourke and Williamson
2000a,b), so the rest of this section only offers a brief survey of freight rates and commodity price
convergence since 1492.
At the beginning of the 17th century, freight costs on the East India round-trip voyage from
Europe were £30-32 per ton, whether carried in a Dutch or an English vessel (Steensgaard 1965, p.
148). A half century later, the freight costs on English chartered ships had fallen to £16-23, or by 23-
50 percent (Steensgaard 1965, Table 1, p. 152), an impressive decline on the face of it. However, it
turns out that the source of the decline was a fall in the turnaround time in Southeast Asia
(Steensgaard 1965, p. 154). Prior to 1640, ships were required to spend time putting down local revolts
in Asian waters, building forts, negotiating agreements, showing the flag, and fending off European8 We say “most” but do not assert “all.” Presumably, the VOC saved on costs by switching to
a permanent Asian fleet. In Steengaard’s words, “The extra expense involved in setting up this
permanent Asian trading fleet must have been slight compared with the saving achieved by employing
the big return ships solely for the purpose for which they were intended” (Steengaard 1965, p. 156).
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competitors. After 1640, chartered ships did not perform these functions, but rather a permanent
Asian fleet of smaller VOC ships did. The cost per ton per trip does not include the cost of the
permanent fleet, borne by the East India Company as before, but not directly included as part of the
charter cost per ton. When these costs are added back in, our guess is that most of the decline in
transport costs over the half century would evaporate.8 Ralph Davis (1962, pp. 262-4) and Bal
Krishna (1924, pp. 321-3) extend the freight cost evidence from the 1650s to the 1730s. They find that
freight costs “were higher in the 1720s and 1730s than they had been in the 1660s and 1670s and they
took another step upward in the 1760s, when they return to the levels prevailing in the early
seventeenth century” (Menard 1991, p. 250). Freight rates for ‘fine’ textiles shipped to England from
the Malabar Coast and Bay of Bengal or from Bombay and Surat show no sign of decline in the 18th
century when deflated by the average prices paid for Bengali and Bombay textiles respectively (Davis
1962, p. 263; Chaudhuri 1978, Tables C.20, C.22). As far as we can tell, there is no evidence of any
transport revolution along Euro-Asian trade routes during the Age of Commerce. 
What about commodity price convergence? We have the required price data for spices and
coffee, items which combined were 68 percent of Dutch homeward cargoes in the mid-17th century
(Reid 1993, pp. 288-9). Figure 1 plots markups for cloves, pepper and coffee (Bulbeck, Reid, Tan and
Wu 1998), where markups are defined as the ratio of European to Asian price. There is plenty of
evidence of price convergence for cloves from the 1590s to the 1640s, but it was short-lived, since the
spread soared to a 350-year high in the 1660s, maintaining that high level during the VOC monopoly
and up to the 1770s. The clove price spread fell steeply at the end of the French Wars, and by the
1820s was one-fourteenth of the 1730s level. This low spread was maintained across the 19th century.
Between the 1620s and the 1730s, the pepper price spread showed no trend, after which, however, it9 A reading of Douglas Irwin (1991, esp. p. 1297) suggests that pretty much all of the
intercontinental trade at this time was by state-chartered monopolies. Like most monopolies, they
raised prices paid by consumers (in Europe), lowered prices paid by suppliers (in Asia), restricted
output and limited trade. This is hardly the stuff that globalization is made of! 
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soared to a 250-year high in the 1790s. By the 1820s, the pepper price spread of the early 17th century
was recovered, and price convergence continued up to the 1880s, when the series ends. While there is
some modest evidence of price convergence for coffee during the half century between the 1730s and
the 1780s, everything gained was lost and more during the French Wars. At the war’s end, price
convergence resumed, so that the coffee price spread in the 1850s was one-sixth of what it had been
in the 1750s, and in the 1930s it was one-thirteenth of what it had been in the 1730s. Thus, there is
absolutely no evidence of commodity price convergence for these “exotic” goods so central to Dutch
trade. Was English trade in Asia any different than Dutch trade? Apparently not (O’Rourke and
Williamson 2000a: Figures 8A-F).
[Figure 1 about here]
Of course, the price spread on pepper, cloves, coffee, tea and other non-competing goods was
not driven solely, or even mainly, by the costs of shipping, but rather, and most importantly, by
monopoly,9 international conflict, and government tariff and non-tariff restrictions. But we are
indifferent about the sources of commodity price convergence: anything that impedes price
convergence suppresses trade, and there is no evidence of secular commodity price convergence
before the 1820s. 
Is there any reason to expect the price spread on competing goods between Europe and Asia
to have behaved differently, as opposed to the non-competing “exotics” we have just examined? We
think it unlikely, especially if we cannot find it for the important East Indian cloth trade. Figure 2 plots
the average prices received by the East India Company on its Asian textile sales in Europe, divided by
the average prices it paid for those textiles in Asia. Again, there is no sign of a secular decline in
mark-ups (where mark-ups include all trade costs, as well as any East India Company monopoly10 All import price data come from Chaudhuri’s (1978) Table C.24, which also provides data
on sales prices and mark-ups from 1664 to 1704. From 1710 to 1759, the sales prices used are those
given in Chaudhuri’s Table A.13 (p. 302); like the earlier data in Table C.24, these are average prices,
but since they are listed in a separate table, we cannot be sure that they are strictly comparable with
those earlier figures.
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profits) over the century between 1664 and 1759.10 This textile trade was extremely large and it was
on the rise. Yet, the evidence on freight rates and mark-ups suggest that growing trade volumes in the
late 17th century were almost certainly driven by the outward expansion of European import demand
or Asian export supply rather than by world commodity market integration per se. If it was
globalization at work, we would see evidence of commodity price convergence and there is none. 
[Figure 2 about here]
The evolution of transport costs in the North Atlantic prior to the early 19th century is
summarized by Russell Menard (1991), and his freight cost indices offer no unambiguous support for
pre-18th century globalization either (although his interest is in transport revolutions, and his evidence is
thus limited to freight rates rather than commodity price gaps). The best case for a North Atlantic pre-
19th century transport revolution lies with the tobacco trade. Between 1618 and 1775, freight charges
on tobacco shipments from the Chesapeake to London fell substantially: adjusted by the Brown-
Hopkins consumer price index, real freight rates fell by 1.6 percent per annum over the entire colonial
period (Menard 1991, p. 255). The worst case for a North American pre-19th century transport
revolution lies with the sugar trade of Barbados and Jamaica, as well as with the rice trade of
Charleston, both with England. Menard (1991, Table 6.6, p. 264) documents stability in the peacetime
real freight charges on sugar between the 1650s and the 1760s, and thus no support for globalization in
the North Atlantic prior to the 19th century. The rice trade also shows no fall in real freight rates
between the 1690s and the 1760s. However, freight rates did undergo an impressive decline after the
1760s (Menard 1991, Table 6.8, pp. 268-9), but there is reason to believe that this late 18th century11 The argument for overstatement is given in O’Rourke and Williamson (2000b), but it goes
something like this: Menard (1991, Table 6.6, p. 264) documents stability in the peacetime real freight
charges on sugar between the 1650s and the 1760s, deflating the nominal charges by the Brown-
Hopkins (1981) consumer price index (CPI) in England. But if sugar prices in Barbados and Jamaica
fell by more than did the CPI in England, the rise in Menard’s real freight rate index would be
understated and its fall overstated. Apparently sugar prices did fall by more (Mechner 1999, Figure
2.2, p. 58a; McCusker and Menard 1991, Figure 7.1, p. 158). The North Atlantic rice trade also shows
a fall in real freight rates after the 1760s,  but, once again, if rice prices in Charleston fell by more than
did the CPI in England, then this late 18th century decline in freight rates is overstated.
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decline in freight rates is overstated,11 and, in any case, it would have been greatly offset by rising
insurance charges in the more hostile world of the French Wars.
There is plenty of evidence of an inter-continental trade boom during the Age of Commerce,
but there is very little evidence of commodity price convergence between the continents.
IV. Demand and Supply: Decomposing the Sources of the Trade Boom
Background
Before we bring some more empirical evidence to bear on what in the traditional literature has
been largely a qualitative discussion about the economic impact of the Voyages of Discovery, we
need, once again, to define terms. Obviously, we take globalization to mean the integration of
commodity markets between continents. The Voyages of Discovery also involved a transfer of
technology, plants, animals and diseases on an enormous scale, never seen before or since; but this is
not the focus of the present paper. Furthermore, the economic potential of the Voyages of Discovery
could never have been fully realized without the peopling of these frontiers and the investment of
European capital in them; thus, it also involved factor markets. More to the point of this paper, the
inter-continental trade boom that followed the voyages of Columbus and da Gama must have had its
source in some combination of three factors: a boom in European demand for tradables (the continent
that was pulling away economically from the Rest), a boom in tradable supply from the Rest, and a12 With the caveat that overseas supply could in principle have boomed due to international
factor migration, another (albeit quite distinct) dimension of what is commonly referred to as
‘globalization’. These migrations would include African slaves to the Americas, as well as “free”
immigration into Southeast Asia from India and China.
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decline in the barriers to trade. If a decline in trade barriers had accounted for the trade boom over
the three centuries following 1492, then globalization would have been the driving force, as implied by
the world history rhetoric. Without any significant decline in trade barriers, world history rhetoric is
incorrect. Instead, global trade boomed after 1492 in spite of barriers to trade and anti-global
Mercantilist sentiment, and it would have been a bigger boom without these anti-global forces.12 
Figure 3 presents a stylized view of trade between some European home country like England
and the rest of the overseas world, like Asia (the latter denoted by an asterisk). MM is the home
import demand function (that is, domestic demand minus domestic supply), with import demand
declining as the home market price (p) increases.  SS is the foreign export supply function (foreign
supply minus foreign demand), with export supply rising as the price abroad (p*) increases. In the
absence of transport costs, monopolies, wars, pirates, and other trade barriers, international commodity
markets would be perfectly integrated: prices would be the same at home and abroad, determined by
the intersection of the two schedules. Transport costs, protection, war, pirates, and monopoly drive a
wedge (t) between export and import prices: higher tariffs, transport costs, war embargoes and
monopoly rents increase the wedge while their disappearance reduce it. Commodity market
integration, or globalization as we define it here, is represented by a decline in the wedge: falling
transport costs or trade barriers lead to falling import prices in both places, rising export prices in both
places, commodity price convergence, and an increase in trade volumes.
[Figure 3 about here] 
The fact that trade should rise as trade barriers fall is, of course, the rationale behind using
trade volumes or the share of trade (exports, or exports plus imports) in GDP as a proxy for
globalization and international commodity market integration. Indeed, several authors (e.g. Chase-12
Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1996) have used Angus Maddison’s data (e.g.
Maddison 1991, 1995) to trace out long-run trends in commodity market integration since the early 19th
century, and historians of pre-industrial experience also use such evidence. However, Figure 3 makes
it clear that globalization is not the only reason why the volume of trade, or trade’s share in GDP,
might increase over time. Outward shifts in either import demand (to MM’) or export supply (to SS’)
could also lead to trade expansion, and such shifts could occur as a result of population growth, the
colonization of empty lands, capital accumulation, technological change, and a variety of other factors.
Alternatively, globalization could coincide with falling trade volumes if MM or SS were shifting
inwards over time. Thus, the only irrefutable evidence that globalization is taking place, on our
definition, is a decline in the international dispersion of commodity prices or what we will call
commodity price convergence. However, we were not able to find it in Section III.
We represent the post-1492 trade boom documented in Section II as a rise from T0 to T1, T2
or T3.  If t remained constant (no move toward more global integration), then outward shifts in either
MM or SS, but not both, would generate a trade boom to T1 (where the price gap, t, remains the same,
although prices change in both markets). An outward shift in both MM and SS would generate a
bigger trade boom to T2 (still holding t constant). If at the same time t evaporated (global integration),
we would observe an even bigger trade boom to T3. Figure 3 is translated into an explicit “sources-of-
trade” equation and estimated in Section V, where the observed trade boom is actually decomposed
into the component parts associated with shifts in European demand and Asian supply. 
Relative Price Trends
Figure 3 makes it clear that the behavior of the relative prices of spices, silk, tea, sugar and
the many other ‘exotic’ commodities imported by Europe from overseas should tell us whether it was
mainly supply or mainly demand which accounted for the global trade boom from 1500 to 1800.
Appendix 1 reports in detail how we calculated trends in the prices of these “exotic” European13 These scholars also took great care with weights, measures and quality. These commodities
are as close to being homogenous over these centuries as the most demanding economist would wish.
14 Indeed, Appendix Table 1 shows that all we’ve got for 1450-1500 is Posthumus on pepper
and ginger, and, even though ginger dominates, prices of the two move in opposite directions! If
pepper is what was really motivating da Gama, then an account which emphasises rising relative
prices prompting greater investment in exploration becomes more plausible. Ginger tells the opposite
story, and Posthumus cannot offer any other exotic non-competing import prices to resolve the
conflict. Thankfully, the data get much thicker after 1550.
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imports relative to a commodity that didn’t travel very far in those times, grain (wheat, oats or barley,
depending on the source used). The evidence is very rich, and the sources well known, which is
surprising given that, as far as we know, they have never been used for this purpose. Three famous
scholars from a previous generation have left behind an amazing data base describing prices for the
three main European participants in the overseas trade: Earl Hamilton on Spain (Hamilton 1934, 1936,
1947); Nicolaas Posthumus on the Netherlands (Posthumus 1946); and William Beveridge on England
(Beveridge 1939). These scholars documented (in most cases, annually) the prices of spices, sugar,
incense, indigo, tobacco, opium, coffee, tea, and other non-competing importables from Asia and the
New World, as they prevailed in major European cities like Amsterdam, London and Seville.13 We
have used these data to calculate trends in the relative price of non-competing importables in every
half-century between 1350 and 1850. The findings are summarized in Table 2, where they are
reported separately for imports from Asia and imports from the Americas, as well as the total.
[Table 2 about here]
The following seven relative price facts emerge from Table 2. First, it was not some
spectacular boom in the relative price of imported “exotic” products – bloating trading profits to even
higher levels -- that sent Columbus and da Gama off to seek them. Granted, the evidence is thin,14 but
what we do have says that relative prices fell across the 15th century. Second, these relative prices
fell even faster in the 16th century, just as one would expect if supply booms in Asia and the Americas
were doing the work. Indeed, the 16th century collapse in those relative prices was bigger by far than14
in any other period save 1800-1850. However, we believe that the forces underlying these 16th and
19th century experiences were completely different. It was not declining trade barriers, commodity
price convergence and globalization that accounted for the dramatic fall in relative prices during the
16th century, but rather booming supply abroad. In contrast, declining transport costs mattered a great
deal in the early 19th century, especially so since income growth in Europe was far faster than at any
time between 1500 and 1850 and it would have served by itself to raise the price of importables.
Third, the secular relative price fall stopped in the 17th century -- actually, prices rose across that
century -- evidence suggesting that a boom in European demand or a collapse in Asian supply was
dominant in the 1600s. Fourth, the relative price of non-competing imports was more stable across
the 18th century, suggesting that European demand and foreign supply changes were more closely
offsetting. However, note that price histories were quite different between the first and second half of
the century. While relative prices were very stable up to 1750, they underwent a fall from mid-century
to 1800, suggesting that booming Asian supply or (more likely for a continent at total war) slumping
European demand dominated during the French Wars. Fifth, the relative price fell across the first half
of the 19th century, and at the most dramatic per annum rate seen across the whole half millennium
before 1850. To repeat our comment above, we view this evidence as consistent with powerful
globalization forces at work after the French Wars (O’Rourke and Williamson 2000a, b), especially so
since those globalization forces (lowering relative prices of importables) had to fight against
accelerating income growth in Europe carried by industrial revolutions (raising relative prices of
importables). Sixth, the relative prices of imports from Asia and the Americas behaved very
differently. For example, during the great 16th century collapse in the relative price of non-competing
imports, those coming from the Americas actually rose in relative price. It was Asian import prices
that were doing all the work during that century, and thus it was Asian supply, not supply from the
Americas, that mattered. The same inverse correlation was present in the 17th century, but in this case15 The American figures for the 16th century depend entirely on just one sugar price series, so
we must be cautious about this finding for that century. However, the 17th century is much more richly
documented for the Americas, and the price observations are certainly not limited to sugar. See
Appendix Table 1.
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while the relative price of imports from Asia rose, it fell for those from the Americas.15 These
apparent differences between Asian and American supply are striking, and we will make use of them
in Section VI. Seventh and finally, over the three centuries as a whole, the relative price of these
import goods declined, suggesting that on average overseas supply-side forces were dominant.
However, it was Asian goods whose relative price fell in European markets over the three centuries,
not the relative price of goods from the Americas.
Measuring European Import Demand
Section V will put some meat on the bare bones just exposed by the movements in the relative
price of non-competing imports. But since those price trends suggest that European import demand
mattered at various points over the five centuries between 1350 and 1850, we next offer a measure of
the growth in that part of European income that generated the demand. Appendix 2 supplies the
details, so here we just offer a summary.
We begin with the premise that the vast majority of the “exotic” imports from Asia and the
Americas were out of the reach of any but the rich: changing living standards of the workers in cities
and villages would have had only a trivial impact on European import demand; changing incomes of
those at or near the top of the income pyramid would have had a big impact. The rich consisted mainly
of landowners, urban merchants, and those in the “residual” class serving the rich and controlling the
poor. Given this premise, we estimate the growth of the European “surplus” by half-century between
1500 and 1850, relying on estimates of the growth in English land rents (documented by Gregory
Clark). Although French land rents (documented by Philip Hoffman) and Dutch and Flemish land
rents (documented by Jan Luiten van Zanden) appear to have behaved pretty much like English land16 For the sake of brevity, we will refer in what follows to these combined supply effects
coming from Asia and the Americas as simply ‘Asia’.
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rents over the full three centuries, the latter are better documented within centuries so we rely on
them in what follows. The results are summarized in Table 3, and they suggest the following:
European surplus income fell in the 16th century, so it could not have contributed anything to the trade
boom; surplus income grew fairly vigorously in the 17th and 18th centuries, when its contribution to the
trade boom must have been much more important; and surplus income boomed in the 19th century,
when it must have contributed very importantly to the trade boom. We will use this evidence in the
next section to implement the trade boom decomposition. 
[Table 3 about here]
V. Accounting for the Trade Boom After Columbus
Europe’s external trade boomed in the three centuries following 1500, but the evidence
reviewed in Section III suggests that the combined effect of changing trade barriers, trade monopolies,
and transport costs cannot account for the boom since there is no evidence of global commodity price
convergence before the 19th century. We have already proposed other explanations for the trade
boom. Now we will go one step further and actually decompose the boom into that portion explained
by shifting European demand and that portion explained by shifting Asian (and American) supply.16
The decomposition is implemented by the following simple partial equilibrium relationship:
where D and D* are demand in Europe and Asia respectively, and S* represents Asian supply.
Equation (1) reflects the plausible assumption that these Asian goods are non-competing; that is,17 The assumption is consistent with the evidence in Section III.
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goods such as spices and pepper were produced in Asia but not in Europe. The Asian price is given
by p, and the European price is p+t, where t is the price gap between the two continents (reflecting
the combined effects of freight costs, trade monopoly mark-ups, and government policy). X is a shift
factor, reflecting the combined effects on Asian supply of population growth, technological change
and so forth. Y and Y* are European and Asian income respectively, where, as we documented in
Section IV,  “income” refers to the surplus above subsistence received by the rich.
Totally differentiating (1), and assuming that the large t does not change,17 yields:
while further manipulation yields:
where Ep and EY represent price and income elasticities of European demand respectively, the same
demand elasticities in Asia are denoted with a star, a ‘^’ over a variable denotes the proportional rate
of change, and ES
p and ES
X are the Asian supply elasticities with respect to price and the shift factor
respectively. Q is the total output of these Asian trade goods (i.e. total Asian supply), while M is the
total trade in the goods (i.e. total European demand).
From equation (3) we can derive the following expression for the rate of change in prices:18 Prices are endogenous, of course. As we have argued, “income” refers to the surplus
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Thus, the change in prices is a positive function of incomes on both continents, and a negative function
of supply shifts in Asia, as expected.
Finally, we want to account for the European trade boom, here written as the growth in
imports,
We can substitute (4) into the right-hand side of equation (5), expressing the rate of change of imports
as
This is the equation which we use to decompose the inter-continental trade boom. Trade growth
depends on three exogenous variables: European income, Asian income, and Asian supply.18 Asian
income growth lowers trade (Ep is negative), Asian supply growth boosts trade, and European income
growth also boosts trade. European income growth appears twice in equation (6); the first term is the
direct positive effect of income growth on European demand. The second, more complicated term is
negative; it reflects the fact that higher European demand and trade will force up the Asian supply
price, and hence the European price as well. This will offer a partial offset to the direct, trade-
expanding effect of income growth (i.e. the demand curve shifts out, but the economy then moves up
the new demand curve). The size of this offset will depend on Q/M, which appears in the denominator
of the second term in the equation: the higher is the ratio of Asian output to inter-continental trade (i.e.
the less significant is European trade in the context of of total Asian supply), the more elastic will be19
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Asian supply (the closer Europe is to being a price-taker), the smaller will be the price increase
associated with the European demand expansion, and the smaller will be the price offset associated
with that expansion.
Section II supplies the data needed to document the growth of trade. Section IV supplies the
data needed to document the growth of the relative price of Asian imports and of European “surplus”
incomes of the rich. In order to estimate the effect of income growth on trade, we also need estimates
of the elasticities embedded in the model, particularly European income and price elasticities of
demand. We derive these elasticities from equation (5), which expresses trade growth as a function of
European price changes and European income growth. Table 4 summarizes the results.
[Table 4 about here]
Abstracting from changes in taste, all of these data and elasticities should be jointly consistent
with equation (5). Focussing on the first two centuries and on the trade data in column (1), it should be
the case, for example, that 
and
which allows us to solve for the two unknown elasticities, Ep and EY. The four rows in Table 4 yield
six pairs of simultaneous equations, and hence six solutions, for these two variables. The six solutions
for Ep are: -1.47, -1.82, -1.48, -1.47, -1.55, and -1.03, with a mean value of -1.47. The six solutions for
EY are: 2.02, 2.21, 2.35, 2.14, 2.07, and 2.52, with a mean value of 2.22. Alternatively, we could use19 See footnote 3 above.
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the ‘volume only’ trade estimates in column (2),19 in which case our estimates for the price elasticity
would be: -1.43, -2.04, -1.45, -1.44, -1.60, and -0.75, with a mean of -1.45. The income elasticity
estimates would be: 0.96, 1.29, 1.52, 1.20, 1.05, and 1.79, with a mean of 1.3.
These estimates seem to fall within a remarkably tight range, and the implied price elasticities
do not seem to be very sensitive to which trade data are used. Income elasticities, however, are more
sensitive to the trade data used: the “volume only” trade data imply a much lower elasticity (1.3) than
the “total” trade data (2.22), and thus income growth will imply less trade growth using the former
calculations. On the other hand, the trade growth to be explained is lower in column (2) than in column
(1).
The last four columns of Table 4 use equation (6), under various assumptions, to calculate the
share of total trade growth explained by the growth in Europe’s surplus income. Columns (5) and (6)
use the trade data in column (1), and the associated elasticities, while columns (7) and (8) use the
trade data in column (2) and the elasticities implied by those. We assume that Asian and European
demand elasticities were identical, that Asian supply elasticities were one, and that the ratio of Asian
output to European demand, Q/M, was either 100 or 10 (i.e. that Europe took somewhere between 1
and 10 percent of the output of these traded goods, a wide range that reflects the absence of even a
guess about these magnitudes in the traditional literature).
The four estimates produce remarkably similar results. European income growth explained
none of the 16th century trade boom: income actually fell during this period, as did the domestic
relative price of these imported goods. The 16th century trade boom can therefore be explained either
by rising Asian supply, falling Asian demand, or by some combination of the two. We will have more
to say about this in Section VI. In contrast, the more modest 17th century trade boom can be explained
entirely by European income growth, as evidenced by the rising relative prices of non-competing20 Interestingly, the recent paper by Baier and Bergstrand (2001) estimates that income
growth explains about 67 percent of the OECD trade boom from the late 1950s to the late 1980s. 
21 This rough guess is based on Maddison (1998, pp. 19-38).
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imports during the period. The 18th century trade boom must be explained by a mixture of demand and
supply: between 59 and 75 percent of the trade boom can be explained by European income growth; it
follows that between 25 and 41 percent of the trade boom can be explained by changing Asian supply.
Over the three centuries as a whole, European income growth explained between 50 and 65 percent
of the inter-continental trade boom.20
VI. Speculations and an Agenda
Did Chinese Autarkic Policy Crowd in Europe? 
The ‘world’ we have been talking about so far excludes China. This is a very big part of the
pre-industrial world to exclude, perhaps representing as much as a quarter of global GDP at that
time.21 The exclusion, however, is consistent with the way this literature is written, since it is well
known that 15th century China went increasingly autarkic, which was a profound switch from a
previously very open trade policy. Between 1405 and 1430, seven great junk armadas sailed as far as
Zanzibar, and Chinese trade with East Africa was sizeable. Chinese envoys went to Mecca, and kings
from Ceylon and Sumatra were brought back to China. To quote from Eric Jones (1981, p. 204):
The emperor Yung-lo ... had found the imported goods ... horses, copper, timber, hides, drugs,
spices, gold, silver, even rice ... to be well worth acquiring. He had sent in return, besides a
certain quantity of silk, ceramics and tea. ... In addition, private trade was growing.
But the last great Chinese fleet was sent abroad in 1433, and soon afterwards private maritime trade
was declared illegal. While the resumption of the imperial voyages was proposed in 1480, the idea was
crushed and by 1553 the art of building large ships had been forgotten (Jones 1981, pp. 203-5).
Although the reasons for the spectacular policy switch are still being debated by specialists, we do22 There was a China trade in precious metals, but apparently very little else (see, for
example, von Glahn 1996).
23 By the phrase “rest of Asia,” we mean South and Southeast Asia. After all, China’s de-
globalization move into autarky was shared, with a lag, by Korea (the Hermit Kingdom) and Japan, the
latter persuaded by American gunboats to open up to trade in 1858 after about two centuries of
isolation.
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know that the ‘inexplicable withdrawal’ continued and intensified. While smuggling and piracy filled
the vacuum for a while, the Mings (1368-1644) eventually banned all trade and much later the
Manchus (1644-1911) pushed the autarkic policy still further. Thus, by the time of the European
Voyages of Discovery, the official imperial policy of shutting China’s doors to external trade was
already in place. And China kept its doors tightly closed through the Mings and the Manchus until, at
the end of the latter dynasty, China lost the Opium Wars and in 1852 British military might pried them
back open again.22 
Three hundred and fifty or four hundred years is a long time to leave world trade in the hands
of others. Is it possible that China’s de-globalization move “crowded in” European trade with the rest
of Asia?23 Might the world trade boom documented in Section II, of which western historians have
made so much, be a figment of Euro-centric trade histories, and might it actually reflect international
economic disintegration, rather than integration? While we only pose this as a proposition worth
exploring, a withdrawal of China from Asian markets would only have had its impact during that
period of transition from an open to a closed trade policy which we take to be from the late 15th
century to about the middle of the 16th century. Once China had completely withdrawn, it could, of
course, have had no impact on world markets. But while it withdrew, the prices of exportables in
South and Southeast Asia would have fallen as demand in a previously major market dried up. At the
same time, the price of importables in South and Southeast Asia would have risen as supply from a
previously major producer dried up. Did relative prices in South and Southeast Asia exhibit these
trends from the late 15th century through the mid 16th century? Better yet, did the price of exportables23
in China fall relative to the price of its importables?
The speculation about a Chinese policy dog wagging a European tail is, of course, consistent
with Table 4 where we show that European demand played no role in accounting for the trade boom
in the 16th century, and that (non-Chinese) Asian supply accounted for all of it. Furthermore, recall the
message from Table 2 which documents a fall in the relative price of non-competing importables in
European markets in the 16th century, but only for Asian goods, not for those from the Americas.
These relative price facts and the sources-of-trade-boom accounting for 1500-1800 are also consistent
with the view that China crowded in European trade with the rest of Asia over the three centuries
following da Gama. Of course, these relative price and trade boom accounting facts are not proof of
the Chinese-retreat-crowded-in-Europe speculation, but they are certainly consistent with it.
A European Population and Trade Boom Connection?
European “surplus” income growth accounted for none of the trade boom in the 16th century,
all of it in 17th century, and about two-thirds of it in the 18th century. What determined growth of this
economic surplus? According to one characterization in Appendix 2 (assumption A), the surplus
consisted solely of land rents. Since land acreage changed only very slowly, or not at all, in England,
France, the Lowlands and the rest of western Europe, the real surplus must have grown at about the
same rate as did real rents per acre. In the 16th and 17th centuries, total factor productivity growth
was very slow in European agriculture (even in English agriculture: Allen 1992), so land rents must
have been driven primarily by land/labor ratios – periods of rising population pressure on the land
being periods of rapid increase in the ratio of land rents to the wages of landless laborers, as well as,
more importantly, periods of rising land rents by themselves. This is the connection for which the
classical model was developed, and, with the exception of one paradoxical episode, the evidence from
England confirms it. 
Elsewhere, we have shown just how tight the English correlation was between the wage-24 Rents rose relative to wages, but rents themselves fell, and it’s the latter which is central to
the argument here.
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rental ratio and the land-labor ratio (1565-1828: O’Rourke and Williamson 2000b, Table 3). Appendix
Table 2 also shows how pressure on the land between 1600 and 1850 not only lowered the wage-
rental ratio but also raised deflated land rents. Thus, European population pressure on the land must
have contributed mightily to the trade boom after 1600, and the mechanism was from decreasing land-
labor ratio, to increasing land rents, to increasing economic surplus, and to demand for “exotic”
imports from Asia and the Americas.
The 16th century is, however, a paradox. While English 16th century population pressure on
the land was as large or even larger than it was in the subsequent two centuries, rents per acre fell
(Appendix Table 2).24 Thus, any Malthusian explanation of the trade boom after Columbus will have
to be enriched to account for this paradoxical century.
An Asian Population and Trade Boom Connection?
Of course, if Malthusian forces in Europe were a major force contributing to the trade boom,
couldn’t the same be true of South and Southeast Asia? Presumably, population pressure on the land
there would have had the same effect. Was there a population boom in Asia (outside of autarkic
China)? If so, did this lead to a growth in surplus incomes, higher Asian demand for its “exotic” trade
goods, and a decline in the Asian export supply of these goods? Or might Asian population growth
have stimulated the production of certain labor-intensive goods, such as textiles, thus contributing to
the trade boom? Unlike in the European case, Asian population growth might have reduced trade or
stimulated it, and we cannot be sure which should have dominated.
In any case, there was no population boom in the most important South Asian region, India,
where population grew at only 0.17 percent per annum between 1500 and 1700, and at only 0.2625 Based on Maddison (1998): Table 1.2, p. 20; Lavely and Wong (1998): Table 2, p. 719; and
Pomeranz (2000). 
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percent per annum between 1700 and 1820.25  If South and Southeast Asia behaved like India, then
the population-cum-trade-boom connection is unlikely to have characterized Asia to anywhere near
the same extent as it characterized Europe. If we had the same kind of long run rent series for India
that we have for western Europe, this issue might be resolved.
An Agenda
Much more research remains to be done on the evolution of world trade following Columbus
and da Gama, and new price histories will help lead the way.
First, our inter-continental price gap evidence does not extend much before 1580, and such
evidence is crucial to understanding the century 1450-1550. We also need to stand on the shoulders of
giants like William Beveridge, Earl Hamilton, and Nicholaas Posthumus to search for more relative
price information within Europe, certainly for the poorly-documented 15th century, but also for the 16th
century where the evidence for American imports is so sparse. More price data would also help
assess the plausibility of the hypothesis that a Chinese retreat into autarky drove the 16th century trade
boom in the rest of the world. Did the relative price of Chinese exportables, like silk and porcelain, rise
in the aftermath of Chinese withdrawal, both in the rest of Asia and in Europe? Did the relative price
of such commodities fall in China? We searched for such evidence in English secondary sources, but
without success so far. Perhaps China specialists can find them in the primary archives.
Second, by the second half of the 18th century the mix of inter-continental traded goods had
undergone a change that would evolve still further in the 19th century. Imported goods like tea and
sugar were being consumed increasingly by the working class, and imported intermediates like raw
cotton were being processed by expanding manufacturing activities, both events suggesting a change
in the sources of European import demand. Tailoring our model to fit late 18th and early 19th century26
circumstances might enable us to provide a disaggregated decomposition of the trade boom for the
three half centuries 1700-1750, 1750-1800 and 1800-1850. Such a decomposition might provide
valuable insights, given the transport revolution of the 19th century, the changing structure of the
European economy at the time, and the debates concerning the links between trade and growth during
the Industrial Revolution.
Third, we would like to know much more about the forces underlying Asian and American
export supply during the three centuries following Columbus. Did Asian population growth, such as it
was, promote or suppress trade? To what extent were changes in the area under cultivation important
factors in Asia (as they surely were in the Americas)? To what extent did European exports of labor,
capital and enterprise play a role in expanding overseas supply?
Three conclusions are inescapable: a quantitative study of the international economy after the
Voyages of Discovery does not support the use of world history globalization rhetoric for the three
centuries before Waterloo; it does support the view that European import demand was an important
part of the trade boom following Columbus and da Gama; and it also suggests that the history of
Europe’s Age of Commerce cannot be written without China.27
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Portugal to/from Asia  1.37 tonnage Prakash: 32
Southeast Asia spice exports  2.53 exports (1940US$) Bulbeck: 12-13
Cloth exports from London  1.84 export volume Fisher: 96
Shipping volume to/fro Span Indies  3.94 toneladas Phillips: 43-4
Average   2.42
1550-1599
Portugal to/from Asia  0.94 tonnage Prakesh: 32
Southeast Asia spice exports  2.31 exports (1940US$) Bulbeck: 12-13
Cloth exports from London  0.10 export volume Fisher: 96
Shipping volume to/fro Span Indies  1.22 toneladas Phillips: 43-4
Sugar exports from Span colonies -6.11 weight Phillips: 58-9
Sugar exports from Port colonies  0.68 weight Phillips: 60-2
Hide exports from Span colonies 1.73 number Philipps: 70-2
Average  0.12
1600-1649
Portugal to/from Asia -3.36 tonnage Prakesh: 32
Southeast Asia spice exports  0.71 exports (1940US$) Bulbeck: 12-13
Dutch East India to Asia  1.62 tonnage Prakesh: 104
Dutch East India from Asia  2.17 tonnage Prakesh: 104
Dutch East India imports from Asia  2.71 imports (florins)Prakesh: 115
Dutch East India from Coromandel  2.76 exports (florins) Prakesh: 180
Dutch East India from Gujarat  1.65 export (florins) Prakesh: 185
English tobacco imports from Amer  0.12 imports (kilos) Steensgaard: 141
English East India to Asia  2.99 exports (£) Prakesh: 106
Shipping volume to/fro Span Indies -1.70 toneladas Phillips: 43-4
Sugar exports from Span colonies  0.15 weight Phillips: 58-9
Sugar exports from Port colonies  0.92 weight Phillips: 60-2
Hide exports from Span colonies-0.96 number Phillips: 70-2
Average  0.75
1650-1699
Portugal to/from Asia  0.25 tonnage Prakesh: 32
Southeast Asia spice exports -0.33 exports (1940US$) Bulbeck: 12-13Dutch East India to Asia  0.48 tonnage Prakesh: 104
Dutch East India from Asia  0.63 tonnage Prakesh: 104
Dutch East India imports from Asia  0.12 imports (florins)Prakesh: 115
Dutch East India from Coromandel  1.65 exports (florins) Prakesh: 180
Dutch East India from Gujarat  0.17 exports (florins) Prakesh: 185
Dutch East India from Bengal  3.07 exports (florins) Prakesh: 196
Dutch from Asia  0.33 exports (florins) Prakesh: 203
Dutch copper imports from Japan  0.23 imports (Dutch lbs) Glamann: 52-3
English East India to Asia  2.79 exports (£) Prakesh: 106
English East India from Asia -1.23 imports (£) Chaudhuri: 508-10
English East India textiles from Asia    0 imports (£) Chaudhuri: 547-8
English tobacco imports from Amer  2.83 imports (kilos) Steensgaard: 141
Sugar exports from Span colonies -3.83 weight Phillips: 58-9
Sugar exports from Port colonies  4.36 weight Phillips: 60-2
Hide exports from Span colonies-2.09 number Phillips: 70-2
Average  0.55
1700-1749
Southeast Asia spice exports  1.68 exports (1940US$) Bulbeck: 12-13
Dutch East India to Asia  1.07 tonnage Prakesh: 104
Dutch East India from Asia  1.20 tonnage Prakesh: 104
Dutch East India from Asia  0.12 imports (florins)Prakesh: 115
Dutch East India from Gujarat -0.40 exports (florins) Prakesh: 185
Dutch East India from Bengal  0.56 exports (florins) Prakesh: 196
Dutch from Asia  1.24 exports (florins) Prakesh: 203
Dutch textiles from Coromandel -0.53 exports (florins) Prakesh: 222
Dutch from Malabar  1.07 exports (florins) Prakesh: 229
Dutch copper imports from Japan  1.02 imports (Dutch lbs) Glamann: 52-3
English East India to Asia  1.88 exports (£) Prakesh: 106
English East India from Asia  2.28 imports (£) Chaudhuri: 508-10
English East India textiles from Asia  2.26 imports (£) Chaudhuri: 547-8
English foreign trade  1.15 imports + exports (£) Deane & Cole: 48
English tobacco imports from Amer  1.80 imports (kilos) Steensgaard: 141
French East India to Asia  2.12 exports (LT) Prakesh: 109
French East India from Asia   0.11 imports (LT) Prakesh: 254
Amer Colonies trade with England  2.60 imports + exports (£) US Hist Stat: 1176-7
Brit Amer Colonies furs to England  1.43 exports (£) US Hist Stat: 1188
Irish exports to Amer Colonies  2.15 exports (£) Truxes: 260-1
Sugar exports from Span colonies  4.63 weight Phillips: 58-9
Sugar exports from Port colonies -2.00 weight Phillips: 60-2
Hide exports from Span colonies 3.08 number Phillips: 70-2
Average  1.33
1750-1799
Southeast Asia spice exports  0.83 exports (1940US$) Bulbeck: 12-13
Dutch East India to Asia -1.10 tonnage Prakesh: 104
Dutch East India from Asia -1.43 tonnage Prakesh: 104
Dutch East India from Asia  0.11 imports (florins)Prakesh: 115
Dutch East India from Gujarat  1.51 exports (florins) Prakesh: 185Dutch East India from Bengal -0.57 exports (florins) Prakesh: 196
Dutch from Malabar  0.69 exports (florins) Prakesh: 229
Danish Asiatic from Asia   3.47 imports (ryx $) Prakesh: 310
English/British foreign trade  1.15 imports + exports (£) Deane & Cole: 48
Amer Colonies trade with England  0.36 imports + exports (£) US Hist Stat:1176-7
Brit Amer Colonies furs to England  3.62 exports (£) US Hist Stat:1188
Irish exports to Amer Colonies  2.69 exports (£) Truxes: 260-1
Sugar exports from Span colonies -0.46 weight Phillips: 58-9
Hide exports from Span colonies 3.86 number Phillips: 70-2
Average  1.17
1800-1849
World constant price exports  4.18 exports (1990US$) Maddison: 239
1850-1899
World constant price exports  2.83 exports (1990US$) Maddison: 239
1900-1949
World constant price exports  1.71 exports (1990US$) Maddison: 239
1950-1992
World constant price exports  5.45 exports (1990US$) Maddison: 239
1500-1599   1.26  (volume only: 1.26)
1600-1699  0.66 (volume only: 0.11)
1700-1799  1.26 (volume only: 0.90)






Sources: Bulbeck, Reid, Tan and Wu (1998); Chaudhuri (1978); Deane and Cole (1967): Fisher
(1939/40); Glamann (1974); Maddison (1995); Phillips (1990); Steensgaard (1990); Truxes (1988);
U.S. Department of Commerce (1975). 
Methods: Some of the within half-century series were shorter than 50 years, but we used them
anyway as long as the route/type time series in question covered more than 25 years. We often had to
interpolate between benchmark dates, but the vast majority of the half century average per annum
rates reported above are calculated from an estimated equation where route/type figures have been
regressed on time and time squared for the half century in question. The half century averages are
unweighted.Table 2
  Average Relative Price of European 
Non-Competing Importables 1350-1850
(changes per annum in percent)
Asia America Total
1350-1400 1.16  na 1.16 
1400-1450 -0.58  na -0.58 
1450-1500 -0.11  na -0.11 
1400-1500 -0.35  na -0.35 
1500-1550 -0.72  0.44  -0.58 
1550-1600 -1.38  0.53  -1.22 
1500-1600 -1.05  0.48  -0.90 
1600-1650 0.39  -0.41  0.14 
1650-1700 0.78  -0.19  0.41 
1600-1700 0.58  -0.30  0.28 
1700-1750 -0.05  0.09  0.01 
1750-1800 -0.49  -0.14  -0.34 
1700-1800 -0.27  -0.02  -0.17 
1500-1800 -0.25  0.05  -0.27 
1800-1850 -1.38  -0.98  -1.15 
Source: Appendix Table 1.Table 3
European “Surplus” Income Growth 1500-1850








Sources and Notes: Derived from Appendix Table 2,
using assumption C.Table 4
                                        The Sources of Europe’s Trade Boom 1500-1800:
The Share Explained by European Surplus Income Growth
( in percent)
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Period M M p Y Share 1 Share 2 Share 3 Share 4
1500-1600 1.26 1.26 -0.9 -0.03 none none none none
1600-1700 0.66 0.11 0.28 0.53 all all all all
1700-1800 1.26 0.9 -0.17 0.43 75.3 71.5 61.7 58.6
1500-1800 1.06 0.76 -0.27 0.31 64.5 61.3 52.7 50.1
(1): per annum rate of growth of trade, using all entries in Table 1
(2): per annum rate of growth of trade, using the volume entries in Table 1
(3): per annum rate of change of relative prices, from Table 2
(4): per annum rate of growth of European surplus income, from Table 3 (or Appendix Table 2)
(5): share of trade growth explained by income growth, assuming trade growth in (1), and Q/M = 100
(6): share of trade growth explained by income growth, assuming trade growth in (1), and Q/M = 10
(7): share of trade growth explained by income growth, assuming trade growth in (2), and Q/M = 100
(8): share of trade growth explained by income growth, assuming trade growth in (2), and Q/M = 1026 In a handful of cases, involving New Castile series spanning two and a half centuries,  the
quadratic trend was clearly not appropriate and regressions were run for the two subperiods 1500-
1650 and 1650-1800. On occasion, as indicated in Appendix Table 1, the end-point for the series
within a half-century would be taken as 1701 (say) rather than 1700.
27 In the case of the English data from Beveridge and the Dutch data from Posthumus Vol. II,
fitted values were generated for missing observations. This generated more British and Dutch entries
in Appendix Table 1, ensuring that the overall results were not as dominated by the Spanish and
Amsterdam prices as would have otherwise been the case.
Appendix 1
Estimating Relative Price Trends, 1350-1850
In order to calculate trends in the relative prices of spices and other goods imported by
Europe from overseas, we collected data on the prices of such goods, and of domestically produced
(approximately non-tradable) grains, in Spain (Hamilton 1934, 1936, 1947), the Netherlands
(Posthumus 1946) and England (Beveridge 1939). In the case of Spain, traded goods prices were
expressed relative to wheat (or an agricultural price index, in the case of Navarre 1351-1500); in the
case of the Netherlands, Amsterdam prices (Vol. I) were expressed relative to the price of Frisian
winter barley, while prices from other institutions (Vol. II) were expressed relative to the price of
wheat; in the case of England, traded goods prices were expressed relative to oats prices.
We ran regressions of all computed relative prices on time and time-squared, over the entire
period for which the series was available.26 We then took the first and last fitted values from these
regressions, within each 50-year period (1350-1400, 1400-1450, 1450-1500 and so on), and computed
the annual percentage rate of change between those first and last fitted values. The series was
included in the table below if there was at least 25 years between the first and last observations,
within a given half-century. Thus, a series would be included for the half-century 1400-1450 if, say,
the first observation (and hence fitted value) fell in 1420, and the last fell in 1448. The series would not
be included if the first observation fell in 1420 and the last fell in 1440.27
For each half-century we then calculated the mean percentage rate of change in prices.
These half-century growth rates were then cumulated to give 100-year and 300-year growth rates in
relative prices, and it is these which are used in the calculations described in Section V of the text.
Full details of the individual price series used are given in Appendix Table 1.Appendix Table 1
Trends in the Relative Price of Non-Competing Imports, 1350-1850
Commodity Start year End year Growth rate (% p.a.)
1350-1400
Cardamom (Navarre) 1358  1400  0.8 
Cinnamon (Navarre) 1358  1400  2.41 
Cloves (Navarre) 1358  1400  0.02 
Ginger (Navarre) 1357  1400  2.11 
Pepper (Navarre) 1358  1400  0.45 
Average 1.16 
1400-1450
Cardamom (Navarre) 1400  1451  0.73 
Cinnamon (Navarre) 1400  1451  -0.41 
Cloves (Navarre) 1400  1451  -1.48 
Cuminseed (Navarre) 1401  1439  -0.14 
Ginger (Navarre) 1400  1451  -1.79 
Pepper (Navarre) 1400  1451  -0.42 
Average -0.58 
1450-1500
Pepper (Posthumus vol. 2) 1462  1500  0.46 




Cinnamon (Old Castile) 1510  1550  -1.81 
Cloves (Old Castile) 1508  1550  -1.87 
Ginger1 (Posthumus vol. 2) 1500  1529  1.36 
Incense (Old Castile) 1510  1550  -1.35 
Pepper (Old Castile) 1518  1550  -1.00 
Pepper (Posthumus vol. 2) 1500  1525  0.18 
Pepper (Valencia) 1504  1550  -0.59 
Asia average -0.72 
Americas
Sugar (Posthumus vol. 2) 1500  1550  0.44 
Americas average 0.44 
Total average -0.58 
1550-1600
Asia
Cinnamon (Andalusia) 1554  1600  -2.89 
Cinnamon (New Castile) 1556  1600  -3.53 
Cinnamon (Old Castile) 1550  1600  -1.48 
Cloves (Old Castile) 1550  1600  -0.58 
Ginger (Posthumus vol. 2) 1550  1600  -1.80 
Incense (New Castile) 1560  1600  -1.75 
Incense (Old Castile) 1550  1600  -0.40 
Pepper (Andalusia) 1555  1600  0.50 
Pepper (New Castile) 1556  1600  -1.37 
Pepper (Old Castile) 1550  1600  -0.56 
Pepper (Posthumus vol. 2) 1550  1600  -1.33 
Asia average -1.38 
Americas
Sugar (Posthumus vol. 2) 1550  1600  0.53 
Americas average 0.53 
Total average -1.22 1600-1650
Asia
Cinnamon (Andalusia) 1600  1650  1.16 
Cinnamon (New Castile) 1600  1649  1.71 
Cinnamon (Old Castile) 1600  1649  1.17 
Cloves (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  2.10 
Cloves (Andalusia) 1600  1650  1.06 
Cloves (Old Castile) 1600  1649  1.75 
Coriander (Andalusia) 1601  1650  -0.69 
Cuminseed (Andalusia) 1601  1650  -0.80 
Incense (New Castile) 1600  1650  0.47 
Incense (Old Castile) 1600  1650  1.13 
Gatimalo indigo (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  0.21 
Nutmeg (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  -0.00 
Small pepper (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  -0.69 
Pepper (Andalusia) 1600  1650  0.12 
Pepper (New Castile) 1600  1649  0.71 
Pepper (Old Castile) 1600  1650  0.43 
Pepper (Posthumus vol. 2) 1600  1650  -1.24 
Pepper (Valencia) 1604  1650  -1.55 
Asia average 0.39 
Americas
Cochineal (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  -0.43 
West Indian hides (Amsterdam) 1624  1650  -0.28 
Sugar, Brazilian (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  -0.37 
Loaf sugar (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  -1.03 
Refined sugar (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  -0.32 
Sugar (Posthumus vol. 2) 1625  1650  -0.68 
Pernambuco wood (Amsterdam) 1609  1650  -0.15 
Yellow wood (Amsterdam) 1626  1650  -0.04 
Americas average -0.41 
Total average 0.14 
1650-1700
Asia
Cinnamon, EIC (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  1.64 
Cinnamon (Beveridge) 1661  1700  -0.20 
Cinnamon (New Castile) 1651  1700  0.45 
Cloves (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  0.51 
Cloves (Beveridge) 1661  1700  0.12 
Preserved ginger (Amsterdam) 1654  1701  1.43 
Ginger (Beveridge) 1661  1700  0.30 
Incense (New Castile) 1650  1700  0.63 
Gatimalo indigo (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  0.22 
Mace (Beveridge) 1661  1700  1.88 
Nutmeg (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  0.68 
Nutmeg (Beveridge) 1661  1700  2.45 
Small pepper (Amsterdam) 1650  1682  -0.57 
Pepper (Beveridge) 1661  1700  3.55 
Pepper (New Castile) 1651  1700  0.32 
Pepper (Posthumus vol. 2) 1650  1700  0.09 
Rice (Beveridge) 1661  1700  0.21 
Saltpetre (Amsterdam) 1665  1701  0.30 
Asia average 0.78 Americas
Cochineal (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  -0.48 
Sugar, Brazilian (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  -0.4 
Loaf sugar (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  -0.88 
Refined sugar (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  -0.35 
Sugar (Beveridge) 1661  1700  -0.12 
Sugar (Posthumus vol. 2) 1650  1700  -0.4 
Varinas tobacco (Amsterdam) 1674  1701  0.10 
Virginia tobacco (Amsterdam) 1674  1701  0.14 
Pernambuco wood (Amsterdam) 1650  1692  -0.10 
Sappan wood (Amsterdam) 1650  1701  0.28 
Yellow wood (Amsterdam) 1650  1692  0.09 
Americas average -0.19 
Total average 0.41 
1700-1750
Asia
Cinnamon, EIC (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  0.53 
Cinnamon (Beveridge) 1700  1750  0.38 
Cinnamon (New Castile) 1700  1750  -0.07 
Cloves (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.24 
Cloves (Beveridge) 1700  1750  -0.26 
Preserved ginger (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  0.33 
Ginger (Beveridge) 1700  1750  -0.16 
Incense (New Castile) 1700  1742  -0.53 
Gatimalo indigo (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  0.23 
Mace (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.46 
Mace (Beveridge) 1700  1750  -0.04 
Tonkin musk (Amsterdam) 1701  1748  -0.50 
Nutmeg (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  0.95 
Nutmeg (Beveridge) 1700  1750  0.01 
Opium (Amsterdam) 1703  1750  -0.21 
Black pepper (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  0.19 
White pepper (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.23 
Pepper (Beveridge) 1700  1750  0.27 
Pepper (New Castile) 1700  1750  -0.19 
Pepper (Posthumus vol. 2) 1703  1747  0.46 
Rice (Beveridge) 1700  1750  -0.48 
Saltpetre (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.05 
East Indian tin (Amsterdam) 1722  1750  -1.07 
Asia average -0.05 
Americas  
Cochineal (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.57 
Cocoa, Caracas (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.21 
Hides, Brazilian (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  0.07 
Sugar, Brazilian (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.45 
Loaf sugar (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.14 
Refined sugar (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.38 
Surinam sugar (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  0.30 
Sugar (Beveridge) 1700  1750  -0.37 
Sugar (Posthumus vol. 2) 1700  1750  0.16 
Havana tobacco (Amsterdam) 1722  1750  1.89 
Varinas tobacco (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.22 
Virginia tobacco (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  -0.06 
Caliatour wood (Amsterdam) 1701  1750  0.09 
Pernambuco wood (Amsterdam) 1703  1750  -0.03 
Sappan wood of Siam (Amsterdam) 1705  1750  1.04 
Yellow wood (Amsterdam) 1703  1750  0.28 
Americas average 0.09 
Total average 0.01 1750-1800
Asia
Cinnamon, EIC (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  0.08 
Cinnamon (Beveridge) 1750  1781  0.73 
Cinnamon (New Castile) 1750  1795  -0.62 
Cloves (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -1.41 
Cloves (Beveridge) 1750  1781  -0.71 
Java coffee (Amsterdam) 1750  1799  -0.58 
Mocha coffee (Amsterdam) 1750  1799  -0.83 
Preserved ginger (Amsterdam) 1750  1793  -0.26 
White ginger (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.51 
Ginger (Beveridge) 1750  1781  -0.65 
Gatimalo indigo (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  0.24 
Java indigo (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.13 
Mace (Amsterdam) 1750  1794  1.37 
Mace (Beveridge) 1750  1781  -1.65 
Tonkin musk (Amsterdam) 1753  1800  0.59 
Nutmeg (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  0.91 
Nutmeg (Beveridge) 1750  1781  -1.83 
Opium (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  0.02 
Black pepper (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.51 
White pepper (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.66 
Pepper (Beveridge) 1750  1781  -1.23 
Pepper (New Castile) 1750  1799  -0.90 
Pepper (Posthumus vol. 2) 1772  1800  0.99 
Rice (Beveridge) 1750  1781  -1.61 
Saltpetre (Amsterdam) 1750  1793  -0.46 
Buoy tea (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -1.60 
Pecco tea (Amsterdam) 1758  1800  -0.11 
Souchon tea (Amsterdam) 1758  1800  -1.53 
East Indian tin (Amsterdam) 1750  1795  -0.93 
East Indian tin (Amsterdam) 1795  1835  -0.32 
Java yarns 'A' (Amsterdam) 1750  1797  -0.91 
Asia average -0.49 
Americas
Cochineal (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.69 
Cocoa, Caracas (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.47 
Surinam cocoa (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.28 
Surinam coffee (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.11 
San Domingo coffee (Amsterdam) 1757  1800  1.39 
Surinam cotton (Amsterdam) 1752  1801  -0.28 
Hides, Buenos Aires (Amsterdam) 1766  1800  0.08 
Sugar, Brazilian (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.50 
Loaf sugar (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  0.75 
Refined sugar (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.42 
San Domingo sugar (Amsterdam) 1751  1799  0.86 
Surinam sugar (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.24 
Sugar (Beveridge) 1750  1781  -0.70 
Sugar (Posthumus vol. 2) 1750  1800  0.61 
Havana tobacco (Amsterdam) 1750  1782  0.76 
Varinas tobacco (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.83 
Virginia tobacco (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  -0.35 
Caliatour wood (Amsterdam) 1750  1796  -2.09 
Pernambuco wood (Amsterdam) 1750  1801  0.05 
Sappan wood of Siam (Amsterdam) 1750  1797  -0.77 
Yellow wood (Amsterdam) 1750  1800  0.39 
Americas average -0.14 
Total average -0.34 1800-1850
Asia
Cinnamon, EIC (Amsterdam) 1800  1841  -0.27 
Preserved ginger (Amsterdam) 1805  1851  -1.56 
White ginger (Amsterdam) 1800  1847  -3.01 
Black pepper (Amsterdam) 1800  1850  -2.39 
White pepper (Amsterdam) 1800  1850  -1.93 
Saltpetre (Amsterdam) 1818  1847  -1.76 
Buoy tea (Amsterdam) 1800  1850  -0.03 
Pecco tea (Amsterdam) 1800  1843  -0.21 
Souchon tea (Amsterdam) 1800  1850  -1.24 
Asia average -1.38 
Americas
Cocoa, Caracas (Amsterdam) 1800  1843  -0.92 
Surinam cocoa (Amsterdam) 1800  1843  -1.22 
San Domingo coffee (Amsterdam) 1800  1850  -2.00 
Surinam cotton (Amsterdam) 1801  1850  -2.66 
Hides, Buenos Aires (Amsterdam) 1800  1847  0.35 
Sugar, Brazilian (Amsterdam) 1800  1848  -0.58 
Refined sugar (Amsterdam) 1800  1851  -0.47 
Surinam sugar (Amsterdam) 1800  1850  -1.06 
Varinas tobacco (Amsterdam) 1800  1843  -2.94 
Virginia tobacco (Amsterdam) 1800  1848  -0.83 
Pernambuco wood (Amsterdam) 1801  1835  0.10 
Yellow wood (Amsterdam) 1800  1835  0.44 
Americas average -0.98 
Total average -1.15 Appendix 2 
Estimating the Growth of European “Surplus” Income 1500-1850
National Accounting Assumptions 
GDP = whP + rA + E, where w = wage per worker (w per L), r = rent per acre (r per A), h = the
labor participation rate (L over population, P) and E = residual income accruing to military, church,
bureaucracy, merchants, traders and so on. Define the surplus as S = rA + E, the income accruing to
landlords and residual claimants. Assume that land is fixed, so A* = 0. Assume also that the labor
participation rate is constant, so h* = 0. Assume finally that the residual claimants’ share of the
surplus is E/S = 0.3 and that, therefore, the landed share of the surplus is rA/S = 0.7.  This estimate is
motivated by the work of Lindert and Williamson (1982: Table 2, p. 393) who document the revised
Gregory King social tables figure for 1688 to be rA/S = 0.698, and the revised Joseph Massie social
tables figure for 1759 to be rA /S = 0.695 (Table 3, pp. 396-7.)
Estimating European Demand Growth 
We assume that it was the size of the European surplus (S = rA + E) that determined its demand for
“exotic” commodities. While we can observe rA, we cannot observe E or its growth, E*, prior to the
19th century, the critical period for any test of the demand-led post-1492 trade boom thesis. Thus, the
A , B and C estimates in Appendix Table 2 correspond to three assumptions which, in turn, offer a
range of plausibility to the S* estimate:
A: Assume E grows like rents (rA), implying S* = r*. This characterizes the residual class as
parasitic on landlords (whom they protect, entertain, educate, fight for, sell to, buy from and so on);
B: Assume E grows like the economy-wide wage bill (wL), implying S* = 0.7r* + 0.3[w* +
L*]. This characterizes the residual class as parasitic on the working class and peasants.
Alternatively, this characterizes the residual class as having a fixed premium above the incomes of
peasants and workers, and that their numbers are in constant proportion to the working class and
peasant numbers (whom they police, bury, preach at, educate, oversee in the workhouses, lead to
battle, sell to, buy from and so on).
C: Assume E grows like the urban wage bill (wLu*), implying S* = 0.7r* + 0.3[w* + Lu*]. 
This characterizes the residual class as having a fixed premium above the incomes of the
urban working class, and that their numbers are in constant proportion to the urban working class.
Note also that it assumes a constant wage gap between city and farm. We tend to favor this
assumption which argues that urban growth is the engine driving imports and exports in the more
advanced parts of Europe.
Appendix Table 2
Three Estimates of the Growth in England’s Surplus 1500-1850
(in percent per annum)
Period       Three Estimates of S* L* r* w* Lu*
  A   B   C
  ________________________________________________________________________
1500-1550  -0.12 - 0.11  0.02 0.60 -0.12 -0.68 1.02
1550-1600  -0.14  -0.24 -0.08   0.58 -0.14 -0.90 0.97
1600-1650   0.84   0.77  0.87 0.49  0.84  0.13 0.82
1650-1700   0.20   0.18  0.20                 -0.06  0.20  0.20 0.01
1700-1750   0.16   0.18  0.31 0.26  0.16 -0.04 0.70
1750-1800   0.32   0.40  0.55 0.80  0.32 -0.20 1.30
1500-1800   0.21   0.19  0.31
1800-1850   1.13   1.49  1.90 1.65  1.13  0.67 3.02
_________________________________________________________________________________
Notes and Sources: The figures for r*, w* and S* are deflated. The nominal wages and nominal
farm land rents for 1565-1850 are from O’Rourke and Williamson (2000a). The nominal rents for
1495-1565 from Clark (1999: Table 6, p. 25). The deflator is the cost of living of farm labor (Clark n.d:
Table 11, pp. 43-44). The labor force (L) estimates are also taken from O’Rourke and Williamson
(2000a), and Lu is derived by applying the share of the population urban (u) to L. The u estimates are
constructed from Bairoch (1988: pp. 177, 179, 215-16, 221) and Hohenberg and Lees (1985: p. 84).     
Growth in Real Rents for Europe’s Leaders 1500-1800
Did the surplus in the rest of Europe’s center grow like that of England? Apparently, based on the per
annum growth rates of rent estimates from France and Holland that follow: 
Period England France Holland Center
1500-1800 +0.21 +0.36 +0.21 +0.28 
The English data are from Appendix Table 2. The French data are from Hoffman (1996: Table 4.2,
pp. 90-1) and the Dutch estimates are from background data to van Zanden (1998: Graph 2, p. 74).
Both France and Holland to 1780 only. The “Center” is an end period weighted average of the three,
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Figure 1. Spice and coffee markups:
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Figure 3.  Explaining the world trade boom